It is a source of puzzled embarrassment to many Garrlhian admirers, who otherwise find in his thoughts a happy marriage of the JlDre sensible of Hindu concepts and the JlDre pro gressive of western values, that Gandhi was not JlDre JTDdest in his affection for the COlI. Yet, it may also be argued, as I intend to do, that Gandhi I s bovine peculiarities are integral, perhaps' seminal, to the whole of his ethical stance; and that a richer urx:l.er standing of the Gandhian symrol of the COlI will lead to a JTDdel of human/animal ethics which may be useful in the west, where the present confusion on that issue is despaired by the supporters of animal liberation and exacerbated by the sociobiologists.
we make no claim that Gandhi's position is representative of Indian culture, for sane of the JlDre traditional reasons for venerat ing the COlI are absent fran Gandhi's ap proach.
Despite his enigmatic claim that "the central fact of Hinduism is COlI protec tion, " [2] Gandhi's COlI is not an especially religious beast.
He does not linger over Krishna's lave for the CCMS, as characterized in the Haribamsa and the Puranas; nor does Gandhi utili,ze the Shaivite irragery of the scholarly and Ferdinand-like bull, Nandi. When Gandhi speaks of his "worship" of the Gandhi's veneration of the COlI is also not obviously connected with caste restric tions on touching defiled arrl polluted mat ter, and eating meat. Ordinarily, In India, upper caste people do not eat Jreat or use leather products, in part because it would be ritually defiling to do so; whereas lower caste persons JlDre frequently eat meat, and sure have as their caste occupations the tarming and preparation of hides.
Gandhi's vegetarianism was based on different notions (non-violence and nutritional, rather than ritual, purity of the body), and COlI protec tion was not a necessary correlation to it. For a time during his wayward youth, Gandhi was a meat-eater, and later on in life he is said to have recarrnended eating meat to sure one undernourished for lack of protein, des pite the vigorous opposition of sane of the upper caste residents of his Ashram at the time. [3] Garrlhi also favored the expansion of tarmeries, to utilize the hides of cattle which had expired through natural deaths.
Econanic and Political Reasons
One may argue that instead of sacredotal and custClTliU}' reasons for venerating the COlI, Gandhi relies fW1damentally on ethical rea sons. Yet, before this argument may be made, one Trnlst acknowledge that Gandhi also had rather practical reasons for regarding the COlI with sane deference.
One of these practical reasons was eco nanic. The COlI is a useful and vital part of village econauy, and for Gandhi, COlI protec tion meant COlI care, the maintenance of cat tle as an important econanic unit.
Gandhi might have vieYJed with sure synq;athy the efforts of Marvin Harris to make India I s teeming cattle population appear eCO:lanically advisable. [4] And Gandhi might also have agreed with Alan Heston that the shabby and ill-tended CCMS are an econanic nuisance. [5] 
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The COlI is a poem of pity • • • the JlDther to millions of Indian mankind. •• CcM protection to me is one of the JlDst wonderful phenanena in human evolution. [1] It is a source of puzzled embarrassment to many Garrlhian admirers, who otherwise find in his thoughts a happy marriage of the JlDre sensible of Hindu concepts and the JlDre progressive of western values, that Gandhi was not JlDre JTDdest in his affection for the COlI. Yet, it may also be argued, as I intend to do, that Gandhi I s bovine peculiarities are integral, perhaps' seminal, to the whole of his ethical stance; and that a richer urx:l.erstanding of the Gandhian symrol of the COlI will lead to a JTDdel of human/animal ethics which may be useful in the west, where the present confusion on that issue is despaired by the supporters of animal liberation and exacerbated by the sociobiologists.
we make no claim that Gandhi's position is representative of Indian culture, for sane of the JlDre traditional reasons for venerating the COlI are absent fran Gandhi's approach.
Despite his enigmatic claim that "the central fact of Hinduism is COlI protection, " [2] Gandhi's COlI is not an especially religious beast.
He does not linger over Krishna's lave for the CCMS, as characterized in the Haribamsa and the Puranas; nor does Gandhi utili,ze the Shaivite irragery of the scholarly and Ferdinand-like bull, Nandi. When Gandhi speaks of his "worship" of the COlI, one should regard this as an alm:>st metaphorical expression and not expect evidence of the Mahabna saying prayers and performing puja in front of cattle or ritually garlanding them with flowers. ritually defiling to do so; whereas lower caste persons JlDre frequently eat meat, and sure have as their caste occupations the tarming and preparation of hides.
Gandhi's vegetarianism was based on different notions (non-violence and nutritional, rather than ritual, purity of the body), and COlI protection was not a necessary correlation to it. For a time during his wayward youth, Gandhi was a meat-eater, and later on in life he is said to have recarrnended eating meat to sureone undernourished for lack of protein, despite the vigorous opposition of sane of the upper caste residents of his Ashram at the time. [3] Garrlhi also favored the expansion of tarmeries, to utilize the hides of cattle which had expired through natural deaths.
Econanic and Political Reasons
One may argue that instead of sacredotal and custClTliU}' reasons for venerating the COlI, Gandhi relies fW1damentally on ethical reasons. Yet, before this argument may be made, one Trnlst acknowledge that Gandhi also had rather practical reasons for regarding the COlI with sane deference.
One of these practical reasons was econanic. The COlI is a useful and vital part of village econauy, and for Gandhi, COlI protection meant COlI care, the maintenance of cattle as an important econanic unit.
Gandhi might have vieYJed with sure synq;athy the efforts of Marvin Harris to make India I s teeming cattle population appear eCO:lanically advisable. [4] And Gandhi might also have agreed with Alan Heston that the shabby and ill-tended CCMS are an econanic nuisance. [5] Gandhi's veneration of the COlI is also not obviously connected with caste restrictions on touching defiled arrl polluted matter, and eating meat. Gandhi OCIlIll){l1y would alternate paragra:fX1g on CON protection with paragra:fX1g on the concept of ahimsa, in an alIJOst liturgical litany. '!bere is ancient precedent for that connection, for although there does not appear to be evidence that the concept of CON protection emerged at the same time in ancient India as that of non-violence, the two concepts certainly appear to develop, buttressed by each other, during the first centuries of the Christian era. According to w.
Norrran Br~, "the idea of Ahimsa and the doctrine of the sanctity of the CON slowly gain status together.
•• roughly about the 5th century to the 4th century AD." [10] What is distinctive about Gandhi's ap proach is that ahimsa is interpreted rather broadly, to incorporate the ethical concept of the unity of all life, and the fX)sitive injooction to love one's fellow being. Ac cording to Gandhi, "the cow merely stands as a symbol, and protection of the cow is the least [one] is expected to tmdertake." [11] Reverence towards the cow "takes the human being beyond his species.
•• the cow to lIE means the entire sub-human world."[12] For Gandhi, cow reverence was a way of expanding one's consciousness, of gaining an identity with the whole of the created order.
That wider identity is allied with the concept of llRltual love, which also is re flected in the symbol of the non-violent cow. For Gandhi, non-violence means not violating the integrity of another living being. 'ilius, Gandhi claimed that, in his opinion, "every little breach of the ahimsa principle, like causing hurt by harsh speech to any one, man, wanan or child, to cause pain to the weakest and the most insignificant creature on earth, would be a breach of the principle of cow protection • • • differing fran it in degree, if at all, rather than in kind." [B] Mediation Between the One and the Many These ethical concepts--ahimsa, respect for all life, and llRltual love--are appro priate to the image of the cow, but they are sanehow insufficient in explaining the dis tinctive p:JWer of the cow as an ethical sym bol.
One has the feeling that the gentle kitten, or the magnanimous water buffalo, might have done just as well.
For Gandhi to have written about the cow with such virulent ethical p:ission, clearly sore other explana tions are in order.
For these explanations, we will look directly at the cow itself, as Gandhi describes it, rather than relying ufX)n Gandhi's ethical interpretations.
What we have foood is that the image of the cow is a symbolic JOCdiation between t\\Q different basic ethical dilemnas.
'!he first of those dilemnas is the di chotany between the one am the many, the tension between the ethical primacy of the integral self and the social whole. How does the cow resolve this dilemna?
On the sim plest level, the cow is a resolution of the dilemna by being both one and many, the cow and many cows.
Gandhi persistently uses the singular form, as Irrlians frequently do, in referring to the cow.
And yet, of course, there are thousands of cows in Irrlia, each of whan partakes in sore way in a generic sa credness.
To harm anyone cow is to lay a hand on the cosmic Mother.
Moreover, not just the cow itself, but one's relationship to it, is a resolution of the tension, a holistic act. 'ilie cow, after all, is a dtnnb animal, a thing which produces doog and pulls plows; and yet it is imputed to be also a close relative: our very mother.
A thing becanes live, personable, a related extension of the self.
Gandhi ex plains this aspect of the cow's symbolic nature as our link with all species.
It is that, but it is also our link with all things, and persons whan we might otherwise regard as things, by reminding us that even the dtnnb cow is our symbolic mother.
'ilie otherness of the exterior world is integrated with the wholeness of the self.
In Martin
Buber's terms, the "it" hcs becerne a "thou."
'ilie cow is appropriate for this symbol in p:irt because it has been assigned that role by being designated the mother cow, the personable, self-extended, relative self. 'ilien too, the role of the cow in the Irrlian village also makes this symbol appropriate, and vital.
The cow is p:irt of the family more than any other animal, physically in the center of things, its various products essen tial to the daily maintenance of the house hold, fran the ghee (clarified butter) used in cooking, to the dW1g-cakes which are used for the cooking fires.
This image of the cow's role in the village is especially evocative for Gandhi, who thought of the Indian village as a para digm for the harmonious corrrnun.ity. Gandhi tended to idealize the traditional village, even though he did not live in any, except those which he recreated himself.
It was in the rural p:ice of life, the econanic self sufficiency and direct personal relation ships, that Gandhi found the closest realiza tion of the truthful, non-violent social ideal.
According to Gandhi, urban civiliza tion has no hope W1til it is penetrated with "the values of the rural life."[141 'ilie COli, then, symbolizes not only the closeness of village relationships but also the character of the village itself.
The symbol of the cow is a symbol of 13 5th century to the 4th century AD." [10] What is distinctive about Gandhi's approach is that ahimsa is interpreted rather broadly, to incorporate the ethical concept of the unity of all life, and the fX)sitive injooction to love one's fellow being.
According to Gandhi, "the cow merely stands as a symbol, and protection of the cow is the least [one] is expected to tmdertake." [11] Reverence towards the cow "takes the human being beyond his species.
That wider identity is allied with the concept of llRltual love, which also is reflected in the symbol of the non-violent cow. For Gandhi, non-violence means not violating the integrity of another living being. 'ilius, Gandhi claimed that, in his opinion, "every little breach of the ahimsa principle, like causing hurt by harsh speech to any one, man, wanan or child, to cause pain to the weakest and the most insignificant creature on earth, would be a breach of the principle of cow protection • • • differing fran it in degree, if at all, rather than in kind." [B] Mediation Between the One and the Many These ethical concepts--ahimsa, respect for all life, and llRltual love--are appropriate to the image of the cow, but they are sanehow insufficient in explaining the distinctive p:JWer of the cow as an ethical symbol.
For Gandhi to have written about the cow with such virulent ethical p:ission, clearly sore other explanations are in order.
'!he first of those dilemnas is the dichotany between the one am the many, the tension between the ethical primacy of the integral self and the social whole. How does the cow resolve this dilemna? On the simplest level, the cow is a resolution of the dilemna by being both one and many, the cow 13 and many cows.
And yet, of course, there are thousands of cows in Irrlia, each of whan partakes in sore way in a generic sacredness.
Gandhi explains this aspect of the cow's symbolic nature as our link with all species.
The cow is p:irt of the family more than any other animal, physically in the center of things, its various products essential to the daily maintenance of the household, fran the ghee (clarified butter) used in cooking, to the dW1g-cakes which are used for the cooking fires.
This image of the cow's role in the village is especially evocative for Gandhi, who thought of the Indian village as a paradigm for the harmonious corrrnun.ity. Gandhi tended to idealize the traditional village, even though he did not live in any, except those which he recreated himself.
It was in the rural p:ice of life, the econanic selfsufficiency and direct personal relationships, that Gandhi found the closest realization of the truthful, non-violent social ideal.
According to Gandhi, urban civilization has no hope W1til it is penetrated with "the values of the rural life."[141 'ilie COli, then, symbolizes not only the closeness of village relationships but also the character of the village itself.
The symbol of the cow is a symbol of psychic unity, a mediation between individu alism arrl differentiation, between the perils of selfishness on the one hand, arrl loss of self on the other.
for Jung, the process of individuatioo acecmplished that unity, by linking the singular, conscious self with the universality of the symbols of the collective unconscious. '!be symbol of the CCM implies a similar process in Gandhian thought, but in Gandhi it also is fused with a social dimen sion.
For as we have just seen, the CCM symbolically suggests the wholeness p:>8sible in relationships with others, arrl the vil lage-like ha.rnony which is the p)tential of human camumities.
~ation Between Authority arrl SUhnission '!be other ethical dilemna which is sym bolically resolved by the characteristics of the Gandhian CCM is the tension between au thority arrl sutxaission, freedan arrl re straint.
This dilenrna was especially acute to Gandhi personally, for if we are to accept his autobiographical account of his child hood, the tension between his father's au thoritarian attitu::1es, arrl his rrother's pas sivity was a major force in the rrolding of his own diverse character, and in the wars which were waged within.
In Gandhi's life history, this tension was resolved rrost happily in the role of nurse, a task for which Gandhi volunteered on several occasions and which he claimed gave him enorrrous personal satisfaction.
It was in the role of nurse that Gandhi tended his father in the tratllllatic IlOlleI1ts during his father's death. Nursing tasks seduced Gandhi into participating in two wars, which other wise he likely would not have done.
And there are many other instances of Gandhi playing the role of nurse-to members of his ashram, his family, calves, arrl miscellaneous animals.
The nursing role is an interesting resa luticn of the tension between authority and sul:mi.ssion, because it fully E!11bodies both. '!be nurse is in one sense a servant, sutrnis sive arrl humbly waiting upon the every need of the patient.
No king has been so totally tended up:m as the patient in the care of an obedient and watchful nurse.
Arrl yet the pitient, in his or her weakness, is totally deperXlent upon the nurse, and in that sense, the nurse embodies absolute and unlimited authority.
'!be IlOther-image also fits the dual roles of the nurse.
Even though Gandhi viewed his own rrother largely as a pissive person, the image of the IlOther in his wri tings clearly indicates the power which a IlOther may hold, if only by re<:.son of our dependency upon her.
I t is the syrrlrane of demanding passivity, which often character izes the rrother image of roodern hUllDr:
"why should you think of me, after all the sacri fices I've made for you?" '!be rrother has enorrrous control, even-perhaps especially in her posture of self-effacement arrl sacri fice. Like the nurse, the IlOther is a media tion between authority and sutxaission by exhibiting both of those characteristics si..rrnlltaneously • '!be CCM, for Gandhi, is a symbol both of the passivity which characterizes the extreme of the dichotany, and, in different m:>ods, the CCM is the nurse, the rrother, which re solves the duality in a passive power. The CCM is saretimes offered by Gandhi as the perfect symbol of the sutxaissive spirit1 "CCM worship means to me worship of innocence. .the weak and the helpless."[lSl Yet this weak and helpless CCM appears, in a renark able passage written in 1940, rrore powerful than our biological rrothers, through the sheer perfection of her sacrificial service:
Mother CCM is in many ways better than the rrother who gave us birth. CUr rrother gives us milk for a couple of years arrl then expects us to serve her when we grcM up.
Mo ther CCM expects fran us nothing psychic unity, a mediation between individualism arrl differentiation, between the perils of selfishness on the one hand, arrl loss of self on the other.
for Jung, the process of individuatioo acecmplished that unity, by linking the singular, conscious self with the universality of the symbols of the collective unconscious. '!be symbol of the CCM implies a similar process in Gandhian thought, but in Gandhi it also is fused with a social dimension.
For as we have just seen, the CCM symbolically suggests the wholeness p:>8sible in relationships with others, arrl the village-like ha.rnony which is the p)tential of human camumities.
ation Between Authority arrl SUhnission '!be other ethical dilemna which is symbolically resolved by the characteristics of the Gandhian CCM is the tension between authority arrl sutxaission, freedan arrl restraint.
This dilenrna was especially acute to Gandhi personally, for if we are to accept his autobiographical account of his childhood, the tension between his father's authoritarian attitooes, arrl his rrother's passivity was a major force in the rrolding of his own diverse character, and in the wars which were waged within.
It was in the role of nurse that Gandhi tended his father in the tratllllatic IlOlleI1ts during his father's death. Nursing tasks seduced Gandhi into participating in two wars, which otherwise he likely would not have done.
The nursing role is an interesting resaluticn of the tension between authority and sul:mi.ssion, because it fully E!11bodies both. '!be nurse is in one sense a servant, sutrnissive arrl humbly waiting upon the every need of the patient.
Even though Gandhi viewed his own rrother largely as a pissive person, the image of the IlOther in his writings clearly indicates the power which a IlOther may hold, if only by re<:.son of our dependency upon her.
I t is the syrrlrane of demanding passivity, which often characterizes the rrother image of roodern hUllDr:
"why should you think of me, after all the sacrifices I've made for you?" '!be rrother has enorrrous control, even-perhaps especiallyin her posture of self-effacement arrl sacrifice. Like the nurse, the IlOther is a mediation between authority and sutxaission by exhibiting both of those characteristics si..rrnlltaneously • '!be CCM, for Gandhi, is a symbol both of the passivity which characterizes the extreme of the dichotany, and, in different m:>ods, the CCM is the nurse, the rrother, which resolves the duality in a passive power. The CCM is saretimes offered by Gandhi as the perfect symbol of the sutxaissive spirit1 "CCM worship means to me worship of innocence. .the weak and the helpless."[lSl Yet this weak and helpless CCM appears, in a renarkable passage written in 1940, rrore powerful than our biological rrothers, through the sheer perfection of her sacrificial service:
Mother CCM expects fran us nothing but grass and grain.
Our llr::lther often falls ill and expects service fran us.
l-Dther COti rarely falls ill. Here is an unbroken record of service which does not end with her death.
Our IIOther when she dies means expenses of burial or crema tion. r-bther CCM is as useful dead as when she is alive.
we can make use of every part of her body-her flesh, her bones, her intestines, her horns and her skin.
well, I say this not to disparage the no ther who gives us birth, but in order to show you the substantial reasons for my worshipping the
'Ibis unusual passage was quoted in its entirety, since it indicates not only the dual characteristics of the CCM symbol but also sarething of Gandhi's passionate, alrrost erotic, expression of it. '!be patently Oedi pal overtones, however, simply tm:1erscore the ar<J1.I!reIlt; for the classical oedipal pattern is also a struggle to resolve the submission to the seductive IIOther and the cx:.mpet.ition with the authoritarian father.
'!be CCM is a displacement of those impulses, but also a resolution of them; the elements are united in the sensual power of the CCM who cares, a sensuality which is accessible through our worship and devotion, and a power which is controllable through our caretaking of the cattle.
These aspects of the CCM are perscrlal to Gandhi, but they are not wholly solipsistic, for one may argue that the basic approach of passive resistance is made out of the same stuff.
That is, passive resistance is both passive and p::JWerful in its resistance; the strategic approach is itself, like the CCM, a roodiation between authority and submission, the loving rother and the angry father.
'!be coercive and the persuasive elements of pas sive resistance lie uneasily together, as political observers are quick to point out; yet few would deny that they are genuinely intertwined, and the one is not simply, at least for Gandhi, a ruse to hide the other. Nor would many deny that the effect of the dual elements is scmething of a fusion, and that Gandhi's politics, like his COti, takes a posture which is both strong and loving, insistent and caring, a posture of concern.
Elements of a Humane Ethic '!be COti symbolism, as employed by Gan dhi, therefore has at least three ethical elements, which may be st1II1llarized as follows:
the unity of all life, as expressed in the cxmcept of ahimsa, which for Gandhi includes the absence of harmful intent. Personhood:
the roodiation between the one and the many which results in the regard of others as relevant persons. Concern: the roodiation between authori ty and submission, which results in a passive power, expressed as concern.
'!bese three ethical elements which are suggested by Gandhi's imagery of the COti fit well into Gandhi I S larger ethical structure, and that structure is daninated by a concept too sopusticated to be symbolized by a CCM, the concept of satya, the ha.nocnious good towards which conflicts are resolved in the ethical and political process known as satya graha.
Satyagraha is possible, according to Gandhi, cnly when the person performing it (the satyagrahi) regards his or her opponents with sufficient personhood to be open to the possibility of discovering truth within them; and then the satyagrahi IIOVes towards the truth-......mich is characterized by wholenesswith a concern for the integrity of the op ponent.
'!bus, the three elements symbolized by the CCM are integrated pieces within the larger pattern in Gandhi's ethical thought. Nonetheless, the three CCM elements of whole ness, personhood, and concern have a certain integrity by themselves, a rudimentary state ment of basic ethical attitudes.
And al though Gandhi did not isolate these three elements fran the larger context of his e thical structure, they are by themselves helpful in solving a particular problem, the ethics of human!animal relations.
'!be notion of wholeness provides an ethical arena, for it implies that the whole realm of relationships anvng the species, and within the species, are subjects for rooral reflection, and the notion of wholeness serves as a gauge of holistic harm::ny against which those relationships may be evaluated. '!be cxmcepts of personhood and cxmcern are the iJrlicators of the integrity of those rela tionships.
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Here is an unbroken record of service which does not end with her death.
Our IIOther when she dies means expenses of burial or cremation. r-bther CCM is as useful dead as when she is alive.
well, I say this not to disparage the nother who gives us birth, but in order to show you the substantial reasons for my worshipping the
'Ibis unusual passage was quoted in its entirety, since it indicates not only the dual characteristics of the CCM symbol but also sarething of Gandhi's passionate, alrrost erotic, expression of it. '!be patently Oedipal overtones, however, simply tm:1erscore the argument; for the classical oedipal pattern is also a struggle to resolve the submission to the seductive IIOther and the cx:.mpet.ition with the authoritarian father.
'!be coercive and the persuasive elements of passive resistance lie uneasily together, as political observers are quick to point out; yet few would deny that they are genuinely intertwined, and the one is not simply, at least for Gandhi, a ruse to hide the other. Nor would many deny that the effect of the dual elements is scmething of a fusion, and that Gandhi's politics, like his COti, takes a posture which is both strong and loving, insistent and caring, a posture of concern.
Elements of a Humane Ethic '!be COti symbolism, as employed by Gandhi, therefore has at least three ethical elements, which may be st1II1llarized as follows:
the roodiation between the one and the many which results in the regard of others as relevant persons. Concern: the roodiation between authority and submission, which results in a passive power, expressed as concern.
'!bese three ethical elements which are suggested by Gandhi's imagery of the COti fit well into Gandhi I S larger ethical structure, and that structure is daninated by a concept too sopusticated to be symbolized by a CCM, the concept of satya, the ha.nocnious good towards which conflicts are resolved in the ethical and political process known as satyagraha.
Satyagraha is possible, according to Gandhi, cnly when the person performing it (the satyagrahi) regards his or her opponents with sufficient personhood to be open to the possibility of discovering truth within them; and then the satyagrahi IIOVes towards the truth-......mich is characterized by wholeness--with a concern for the integrity of the opponent.
'!bus, the three elements symbolized by the CCM are integrated pieces within the larger pattern in Gandhi's ethical thought. Nonetheless, the three CCM elements of wholeness, personhood, and concern have a certain integrity by themselves, a rudimentary statement of basic ethical attitudes.
And although Gandhi did not isolate these three elements fran the larger context of his ethical structure, they are by themselves helpful in solving a particular problem, the ethics of human!animal relations.
'!be notion of wholeness provides an ethical arena, for it implies that the whole realm of relationships anvng the species, and within the species, are subjects for rooral reflection, and the notion of wholeness serves as a gauge of holistic harm::ny against which those relationships may be evaluated. '!be cxmcepts of personhood and cxmcern are the iJrlicators of the integrity of those relationships.
'!his "CXM ethic" of Ganfu.i is sufficient to build sound attitudes of humane regard for the lesser =eatures.
After all, one would be unlikely to abuse an animal or to treat it ungenerously, if one regarded that animal as a perscn with whan one has a relationship of concern.
Yet, this rather elementary I10ral attitude is predicated on one's acceptance of the notion of the wholeness of all life, a notion which cares easily in the Hindu context, but less easily in the context of the West, where it is rurrored that only hurrans have been gifted with souls.
Animal Rights and Animal Liberation Thus, in Western philosophy and religious thought, there has been an ethical laCLU1a in the shape of an animal, for there has never been any clear-headedness about hC1tl animals should-or could--be ethically regarded.
Western law, secular as well as I1Oral, has simply exacerbated the problem with the insistance on the concept of rights as the principle of legal and ethical behavior.
Rather than our relationship with animals, it is the nature of animals themselves which is at issue in determining whether they are or are not the sorts of things which are deserving of fundamental rights.
The animal welfare and anti-vivisection =usades, which were particularly ardent in England in the last century, and which have recently surfaced there again, and in this country, slip into the same quarrlary when they insist up:m "animal rights." [17] '!heir arguments appear to be sadly tautological: animals are the sorts of things which deserve to have rights, therefore they should have rights.
The problem, of course, is that if it were so obvious to everyone that animals should have rights, they would doubtless have had them.
The "animal rights" people are, therefore, not arguing out of rational principle but waging a crusade, a =usade for wider recognition of the rights-worthiness of lesser species.
'!he problem is that rights are assigned sanewhat arbitrarily and are always subject tc disagreeroont regarding the boundary between those beings who are worthy of rights and those who are not. In earlier generations, the issue was over slaves and WCIleIl, an issue which appears to be finnly settled in their favor. Today, the issue is over the rights of the foetus and the newly born, the unconscious, the CXI'llatose, and the suicidal, and the rights of animals.
On the horizon are the issues of rights to be discussed by sane future generation: the rights of rocks, and whether trees have standing. [18] Perhaps the concept of "animal liberation" might itself be liberated fran the burden of an ethic based on rights. An ethic of relationships, with its implications of responsibility and concord, might be a I10re useful place to begin.
And for that, we might I10destly employ Gandhi and his threefold ethic of the CXM.
A Response to the Ethic of Sociobiology
However, even if Western ethics and philosophy have been negligent in providing an understanding about the relationship of hurrans with other species, Western science has not.
Indeed, the theological trem:>r which was felt on the occasion of Darwin was an indication of the seriousness with which the biological explanation was taken.
The theories of evolution contained the elements of an ethic.
Yet, it has not been until the advent of sociobiology that the implications of that ethic have becane obvious.
Human/animal relationships, although taken seriously, are no longer of critical issue. In sociobiology the genetic dispositions to survival traits are assumed to underlie all attitudes and activities of humans and other species, including those of their inter-relationships. At its I10st radical extraoos, sociobiology justifies, by its ccrnpetitive survival advantages, certain racist and sexist attitudes, and in that justification lies the evidence of an ethic, or at least, an anti-ethic.
'fue starting point of sociobiology and the starting point of Gandhi are not far apart, however; both begin with the unviolatable sense of the unity of all life and the conviction that there are cxmron stanjards which we should use to gauge all species. Gandhi and sociobiology part canpany with their choice of standards.
And yet ~ere is an area of sociobiology's concern which might admit sane of Ganfu.i after all; this is the paradox that survival may frequently involve cooperation as well as <XYnpetition.
It is a Darwinian paradox that cx:.mpetition, in sane cases, may vitiate a species' '!his "CXM ethic" of Ganfu.i is sufficient to build sound attitudes of humane regard for the lesser =eatures.
And yet~ere is an area of sociobiology's concern which might admit sane of Ganfu.i after all; this is the paradox that survival may frequently involve cooperation as well as <XYnpetition.
It is a Darwinian paradox that cx:.mpetition, in sane cases, may vitiate a species' survival, and a:x>peration enhance it.
The lone aggressive ant, by biting the foot of a boar, may signal his presence and find his ambitions erased by the scrape of a toe, whereas the cooperative ant, in ccncert with persevering thousands, could send that boar into delirious termination.
The point is that even by sociobiology's own lindted point of reference, the quest for survival, there is an opening for an ethic based on a:x>pera-tion, 1lU.1tuality of trust, and collective obligations.
The basic cow ethic of Gandhi does not require 1lU.1ch llOre than that.
The virtues of wholeness, personhood, and COr1cen1 in relationships can be understood and even admired in species other than our own. Whether these are attitudes that are volitional in llOtivation or are due to biological predisposition would surely be debated, but faced with the apparent bestialization of human values by biology, we can hardly resist the tE!llPtation to humanize the acts and attitudes of the lesser beasts.
Whether the cow ethic is indeed the ethics of the cow is not, however, a soluble or urgent issue.
Issues of human/animal relations may appear to be both, although those issues which are soluble are frequently not urgent, and those which are urgent often cannot be solved.
We have at least in Gandhi 's understanding of the cow the elercents of ethical attitooes which, if they do not lift the burdens and honor the lives of other species, will surely ennoble the lives of our own in the attE!llPt.
BEIWEEN 'mE SPEX::IES survival, and a:x>peration enhance it. The lone aggressive ant, by biting the foot of a boar, may signal his presence and find his ambitions erased by the scrape of a toe, whereas the cooperative ant, in ccncert with persevering thousands, could send that boar into delirious termination.
